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 ISLAMIC “NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS”? 
RADICAL ISLAM, AL-QA’IDA AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY* 
 
 
 
Philip W. Sutton and Stephen Vertigans† 
 
 
 
European new social movement (NSM) theory was developed to describe and explain the 
apparently unique character of the wave of collective action that began in the 1960s and 
continues to this day. Key characteristics of NSM theory are a post-industrial orientation, 
middle-class activist core, loose organizational form, use of symbolic direct actions, creation 
of new identities, and a “self-limiting radicalism.” The theory’s claims to movement innova-
tion were later criticized by many as exaggerated and ahistorical. However, the filtering down 
of key NSM elements into social movement studies has led to changing definitions of what 
social movements actually are and opened up new opportunities for the integration of 
religious movements into the social movements mainstream. Using the case of radical Islam, 
and with particular reference to the terrorist social movement organization al-Qa’ida, this 
article argues that drawing on key features of NSM theory should lead to a better under-
standing of radical Islam as well as a more realistic explanation of its continuing development 
and transformation.  
 
 
 
The field of social movement studies has, until very recently, not shown much interest in 
either moderate or radical Islamic movements. As Kurzman (2004: 289) argues, “Over the 
past generation, the fields of social movement theory and Islamic studies have followed 
parallel trajectories, with few glances across the chasm that has separated them.” Evidence for 
this assertion can be found in the lack of integration of Islamic movement studies into the 
social movements mainstream. In introductions and edited collections of the last decade, 
studies of Islamic movements are conspicuous by their relative absence. McAdam, McCarthy 
and Zald’s (1996) collection draws on many secular movements but not Islamist mobil-
izations. Tarrow (1998: 185) rightly identifies Islamic fundamentalism as one of three “trans-
national social movements,” but does not pursue the characterization. Della Porta and Diani’s 
(1999: 22) introduction is inspired by “the experience of ‘new movements’” but these do not 
include religious movements and there are no indexed references to Islam or Islamic move-
ments. Similarly, Crossley’s (2002) introduction has no indexed reference to Islam and his list 
of representative social movements has no room for Islamic movements (2002: 1). Finally, 
Goodwin and Jasper’s (2003) recent volume includes just one selection on Islam, Kurzman’s 
(1996) analysis of the Iranian revolution, the one “Islamic” subject that has attracted the 
attention of social movement research, presumably because of its geopolitical significance.1  
However, over the last five years there is evidence of an emerging interest in the 
application of theories and concepts from social movement studies to Islamic movements 
(Lubeck 2000; Wickham 2002; Wiktorowicz 2001, 2004; Clark 2004; Kurzman 2004; 
Oberschall 2004).  This article contributes to this emerging research focus as well as to wider 
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debates on the integration of religious movements within social movement studies. The 
relative neglect of religious movements in general reviews of social movement studies, 
testifies to the widespread theoretical separation of the secular from the religious and the 
corralling of the latter into the specialized field of the sociology of religion where studies of 
cults, sects, and new religious movements mostly take place.2 Oberschall’s (2004: 34) explan-
ation for the marginal status of religious movements is 
 
Many Western academics are fixated on a poverty-social injustice-exploitation 
interpretation of discontent and grievance in the third world and [on] secular 
ideologies and justifications for action. They are confused and bewildered by 
religious crusaders who dedicate their lives to realizing God’s will on earth, by 
violence if necessary. 
 
If so, then we might have expected European new social movement (NSM) theory, which 
shifted away from this mainstream materialism to focus on newer “value-based” social move-
ments, to have found room for religious movements. Yet, with few exceptions, research into 
NSMs remained primarily focused on secular Western movements such as environment-
alism, student movements, gay and lesbian movements, feminism, disabled people’s move-
ments and others. This is unfortunate as some of the central “new” features attributed to 
NSMs can be shown to characterise both moderate and radical Islamic movements, calling 
into question some popular assumptions regarding the character of the latter. In order to 
pursue this argument, the constituent elements of the NSM thesis can be analysed. 
  
 
KEY FEATURES OF NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
 
Although NSM theories are not homogeneous, six elements stand out as commonly recog-
nized features of NSM activity. 
1. Post-industrial and Postmaterial Politics. In Western Europe the emergence of a group 
of seemingly “new” movements amid a wave of collective action was seen as indicative of 
social-structural and economic change. Compared to industrial welfare-based and labor move-
ments whose central concerns were class inequality, wealth distribution and lobbying the state 
for reforms (Habermas 1981; Offe 1990), NSMs represented the emerging post-industrial 
society and the displacement of class-based social movements (Touraine 1971, 1981; Melucci 
1985, 1989). NSMs reflected the post-industrial rise of postmaterial values and goals related 
to the quality rather than the quantity of life (Inglehart 1977, 1990). In doing so, NSMs 
demonstrated a new expressive form of political engagement centered on the formation of 
identities that posed new challenges to existing political systems and parties (Kitschelt 1990; 
Dalton and Kuechler 1990). Arguably this link to post-industrial change was the central 
theoretical claim of “strong” versions of NSM theory. 
2. New Social Constituencies. NSMs defied a simple class analysis. Their activist core 
was drawn from the “new middle class,” those employed in welfare, creative, and educational 
sectors (Mattausch 1989). Since the 1960s student movements, a variety of social groups have 
engaged in movement activity, generating forms of political activity around quality of life 
issues rather than self-interest and rooted in workplaces. Beyond the core activists, large-scale 
demonstrations and collective protests brought together supporters in socially differentiated 
rainbow coalitions, not easily accounted for by social movement perspectives tied to ma-
terialist explanations. Such mobilizations suggested a form of politics emerging outside the 
formal institutionalized system (Offe 1985) that was not reducible to working-class interests.  
3. Anti-Hierarchical Organization. Although NSMs are diverse, movement scholars have 
noted that they represent the emergence of a relatively new type of social movement charac-
terized by loose networks, anti-hierarchical structures, and participatory approaches to organi-
zation (Olofsson 1987; Melucci 1985). NSM activists embraced relatively loose forms of 
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organization and operated in the sub-political world of everyday life in contrast to the hier-
archical and tightly organized trades unions and mainstream political parties. Even within the 
new Green political parties, attempts were made to prevent the accretion of power including 
regular rotation of the leadership and participatory rather than representative policy making. A 
form of “anti-political politics” seemed to be emerging (Havel 1988). 
4. Symbolic Direct Actions. NSMs created varied action repertoires, but the most striking 
element within these was their use of symbolic direct actions. Relying on mass media atten-
tion to bring new issues before the public, direct action symbolized the changes NSMs sought 
to bring about in the future. Newly formed groups such as Greenpeace quickly became adept 
at creating “eco-dramas” (Harries-Jones 1995) symbolising the struggles of relatively power-
less groups against states and multinational corporations. Working outside established 
political processes and interest representation, NSM actions directly targeted problems at 
source. Adopting a non-violent approach to protest was itself symbolic of their attempts to 
bring about cultural change rather than attempting to take political power.  
5. Self-limiting Radicalism. One significant difference between old movements and 
NSMs was the latter’s limited political ambitions (Cohen 1985). Whilst socialist, fascist, and 
communist movements sought state power to shape societies according to their ideological 
programs, NSMs eschewed such grand schemes. Instead, the “radicalism” of NSMs was 
limited by their focus on the defense of civil society against state encroachment (Habermas 
1981). Similarly, NSM organizations’ attempts to combine radical aims with reformist strate-
gies and to reconcile new-middle-class interests with those of marginalized groups distin-
guished the new movements as a group (Papadakis 1988). Their coherence consisted of a 
shared “ideological bond” centered on, “a humanistic critique of the prevailing system and the 
dominant culture . . . and a resolve to fight for a better world here and now with little, if any, in-
clination to escape into some spiritual refuge” (Dalton and Kuechler 1990: 280). This new form 
of political-cultural engagement encouraged the construction of new social identities. 
6. New Identities. NSMs worked at creating new identities via an expressive politics 
promoting self-realization and the right to autonomy rather than the assimilation of movement 
demands into mainstream politics. Living out the lifestyle changes they sought for the future 
gave credence to the 1960s feminist slogan, “the personal is political.” However, the NSM 
focus on the right to difference was at odds with the older assimilationist equal rights move-
ments that fought for inclusion into mainstream society. Expressive identity politics flowed 
directly from the weakening of class identification in the emerging post-industrial society, thus 
befitting a society increasingly dominated by service-sector employment.  
 
 
CRITICISM AND ASSESSMENT 
 
The description of post-1960s activism presented above makes a strong case for the 
emergence of a genuinely new type of social movement. However, by the late 1990s, the 
weight of criticisms against NSM theory strongly suggested that the linkage of movement 
characteristics to post-industrial change had been exaggerated. Tarrow (1998: 202) sum-
marized the views of many, arguing that that NSM challenges to existing social movement 
theories, “have paled as these movements went through life cycles much like their prede-
cessors.” In short, NSM theory failed to take account of the cyclical process of movement 
formation, development and establishment, mistaking the features of one formative stage in 
the development of movements for the emergence of a distinctive new type of post-industrial 
social movement (Brand 1990). Other critics noted that loose networks of activists, non-
violent direct actions, postmaterial values and expressive identity-based politics can all be 
found within earlier social movements (Bagguley 1992; Calhoun 1995; D’Anieri et al 1990; 
Gould 1988; Sutton 2000). Hence, the argument that NSMs were evidence of the birth of a 
new type of movement lost much of its force, as NSMs did not seem quite so “new” after all. 
  Mobilization 
 
104 
Nevertheless, even if such criticisms are conceded, it can still be argued that the “bold 
conjecture” represented by NSM theory has contributed to new lines of research in some 
previously under-researched or neglected aspects of all social movements. The theory also 
focused attention on some key features of many movement mobilizations since the 1960s. 
Social movement scholars were alerted to the role of changing social values in the shaping of 
movement activity: the “horizontal” movement networks underlying public demonstrations 
and protest, the use of direct action and cultural symbols together with processes of identity 
construction. These elements formed the spine of NSM theorizing. Therefore, Tarrow’s con-
clusion needs to be qualified. NSM theory has made a significant contribution to social 
movement studies, leading to revised definitions of what social movements actually are. 
Diani’s synthetic definition illustrates this point (see also della Porta and Diani 1999: 14-16):  
 
A social movement is a network of informal interactions between a plurality of 
individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, 
on the basis of a shared collective identity. (1992: 13) 
 
While this definition looks for common ground in American and European approaches, it 
clearly owes much to the influence of NSM theorizing. 
With its inclusion of central NSM features, Diani’s revised definition also fits Islamic 
radicalism very well. The radical Islamic movement is organized through networks of inter-
actions between a plurality of activists, groups and organizations that are engaged in both 
political and cultural conflicts on the basis of radical Islamic identities. In addition, some of 
these groups engage in symbolic direct actions linked to a strongly held religious ideology. They 
are also focused on post-industrial concerns rather than industrial or social class-based issues. 
With these features in mind, it may be that “new” movement activity will not be restricted to 
the secular, non-violent and “self-limiting” activities of Western NSMs, but will also include 
the growth of religious movements prepared to use violent methods in pursuit of their aims. 
The rest of the article outlines and evaluates this possibility. 
 
 
THE TRANSNATIONAL RADICAL ISLAMIC MOVEMENT 
 
The numerous groups involved within the broadly based Islamic resurgence cannot be 
considered as components of a homogeneous Islamic movement. This resurgence incorporates 
increases in levels of belief and practices of individuals and groups, often within predomin-
antly secular social relations. The resurgence is characterized by increases in levels of mod-
erate religiosity amongst individuals generally not connected to social movements. At the op-
posite or extreme end of the spectrum of the Islamic resurgence are participants and sup-
porters who adhere to a radical interpretation of Islam that seeks to transform majority-
Muslim societies into Islamic states and/or unite the ummah (global community of Muslims). 
Within this wider radical Islamic movement are social movement terrorist organizations 
(SMTOs) that use violence as a means to achieve their aims. Groups within the radical move-
ment seek a greater role for Islam within social relations and institutions but vary in religious 
interpretations and strategic approach. For example, some groups, including Tablighi Jamaat 
focus upon improving individual faith and practice, predominantly in South Asia. Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad in the Palestinian territories seek to bring about an Islamic Palestinian nation-
state, whilst the “hardcore” within al-Qa’ida and associated groups—including Islamic Jihad 
and al-Gamaat al-Islamiyya from Egypt, Harkat al Jihad in Bangladesh and Jamiat-ul-Ulema-
e-Pakistan3—emphasize achieving a global Islamic community, the Ummah, and adapting 
divine law to the modern world. 
Within the radical movement, al-Qa’ida has become widely known for advocating 
violence to bring about revolutionary change and currently remains the most prominent group 
within the wider movement. Its methods and objectives can be distinguished from the more 
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moderate and popular Islamic resurgence. The prominence of al-Qa’ida, its participants’ abil-
ity to attract media attention, oversimplified media reports and political opportunism on the 
part of some governments, have contributed to a popular misunderstanding that radical Islam 
simply is al-Qa’ida, which is then held responsible for all acts of “Islamic terrorism.” Draw-
ing on social movement theories and concepts, particularly those features drawn from NSM 
theory, helps to place al-Qa’ida within the wider radical movement and bring into view the 
group’s relations with other SMOs. 
The emergence of al-Qa’ida can be traced to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the 
ensuing war (1979-1989). From an initial focus on welfare provision, the group has since 
sought to overcome divisions within Islam and then to provide an international army capable 
of defending Muslims from oppression (Bergen 2001; Burke 2003; Reeve 1999). Following 
the end of the war the “Arab Afghans” left Afghanistan trained in armed combat with higher 
levels of religiosity and the basis of an emerging international network, the cornerstone of al-
Qa’ida before 11 September 2001. Fighters returned to countries with secular cultures and/or 
religious regimes widely considered to be corrupt, with which they quickly became disen-
chanted, reinforcing their radical interpretation of Islam (Orbach 2001; Rashid 2000; 
Vertigans and Sutton 2001). This radical religious interpretation of world affairs has arguably 
become more significant after the disintegration of communism and represents one possible 
configuration for a post-industrial politics.  
 
Al-Qa’ida, Non-material and Postmaterial Politics 
 
Ideologically, the roots of al-Qa’ida reflect its internal international coalition and can be 
traced to the growing militancy of radical Islamic thinkers and organisers. A range of both 
ideological and organizational influences, including Ibn Taymiyya (1268-1328), Wahhabism 
from the Arabian peninsular, Deobandis across the Indian sub continent, the Pakistani 
Jamaat-i-Islami, and the Muslim Brotherhood across the Middle East,4 have been brought to-
gether in a unique fusion. Al-Qa’ida’s ideological position is therefore grounded in earlier 
radical thought that has been synthesized and adapted to contemporary events, providing a 
framework for life across economic, political, social, cultural, philosophical, and legal spheres. 
Radical groups’ non-material motivations are similar, though not identical, to the rising 
postmaterial values identified by NSM theorists in so far as these stand behind or form the 
backdrop to collective action and are not easily explained as purely economic grievances. Bin 
Laden’s statements often exemplify this. Rejecting Western materialist explanations for the 
rise of militant Islam, bin Laden states, 
 
They [Western commentators] claim that this blessed awakening and the people 
reverting to Islam are due to economic factors. This is not so. It is rather a grace 
from Allah, a desire to embrace the religion of Allah. . . . When the holy war called, 
thousands of young men from the Arab Peninsula and other countries answered the 
call and they came from wealthy backgrounds. . . . We believe that this is the call we 
have to answer regardless of our financial capabilities (1998b).  
 
Bin Laden’s deputy, al-Zawahiri (2001) also points out that the values radicals hold exceeds 
material interests and personal loyalties as they, “have abandoned their families, country, 
wealth, studies and jobs in search for jihad arenas for the sake of God. ” In 2002 bin Laden 
criticized moden materialism, stating, “I urge you to seek the joy of life and the afterlife and 
to rid yourself of your dry, miserable, and spiritless materialistic life” (2002a). Though they 
cannot be entirely separated from material issues, such religious motivations cannot easily be 
reduced to these either.   
The development of the radical movement is also connected to political, economic, 
social, and cultural changes associated with post-industrialism and post-material values and 
the interrelated processes of modernization and globalization. In this respect, there do not 
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seem to be any conclusive reasons why the religious orientation of radical Islamic groups 
should prevent a mainstream social movement analysis. Tarrow (1998: 112) notes that, 
“Because it is so reliable a source of emotion, religion is a recurring source of social move-
ment framing. Religion provides ready-made symbols, rituals and solidarities that can be 
accessed and appropriated by movement leaders.” Framing protest and collective action in 
strongly religious terms, deferring to a higher power and tapping into highly significant cul-
turally embedded ideas of “holy war,” may even lend a stronger legitimacy to ideologically 
committed violent actions than that available to secular movements. 
 
Radical Islamic Constituencies 
 
Though social movement theories have previously neglected Islamic movements, this 
does not mean that the social sciences have ignored the Islamic resurgence or the rise in 
national and international terrorism. On the contrary, a large amount of research has been 
undertaken which has tended to be dominated by explanations grounded in the secularization 
paradigm. From this perspective, both the broad Islamic resurgence and minority Islamic 
terrorism are widely considered as short-lived phenomena related to economic exclusion (e.g., 
Ayubi 1991; Hiro 2002; Mehmet 1990; Paz 2001) and thus amenable to a materialist expla-
nation. Certainly some members of radical groups are unemployed or have businesses and 
occupations threatened by modernization and many want a greater share in national wealth. 
But one of the surprising findings in recent studies of radical Islamist networks is the prepon-
derance of middle-class individuals and those from professional backgrounds. For example, 
Sageman’s (2004) study of biographical data of 172 Islamic militants has identified the over 
representation of the well educated, upper and middle classes. This is noticeable in the socio-
economic backgrounds of al-Qa’ida’s pre-9-11 leadership, which included bin Laden (a multi-
millionaire), al-Zawahiri (a surgeon), Mohammed Atef (a police official), Khalid Shaikh 
Mohammed (an engineer) and Saif al-Adel (an army colonel). Al-Qa’ida has also garnered 
considerable financial backing from other wealthy donors.  As outlined above, this is a similar 
finding to earlier surveys of West European NSMs. The element of surprise stems from pre-
vious neomarxist or materialist assumptions that the structural location of the middle class 
does not predispose it to radical politics, much less so to violent and terrorist activity. 
At the level of operational management, the group relies on knowledgeable, educated and 
skilled recruits who provide communicative, technological, administrative and organizational 
qualities that are essential to their continuing international militancy.5 Membership of al-
Qa’ida and the wider radical movement is much broader, drawn from across Eastern Africa, 
the Middle East, Central, South, and South Eastern Asia, and the West. Many militants join 
the movement in countries other than where they grew up while others belong to the second 
generation of migrants to the West. Sageman’s (2004: 92) study of international jihadis found 
that, “seventy-eight percent were cut off from their cultural and social origins.” The move-
ment also covers different socioeconomic groupings, ethnicities and nationalities and in the 
case of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Palestinian territories, involves many women activists. 
In this sense, the combination of a largely middle-class leadership and socially differentiated 
groups of movement supporters is similar to the structure of many other social movements, 
including NSMs (Bagguley 1992). 
 
Organizational Diversity and Change  
 
The transnational character of al-Qa’ida and the wider radical movement can be seen in 
the networks and coordinated actions directed at local and international targets across the 
world. Diverse organizational forms and an international emphasis have also been enabled by 
the ways in which activists have, “embraced the artifacts of globalization” (Bergen 2001: 21) 
by using satellite phones, computers, fax machines, and modern methods of transportation to 
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communicate, attract support, and carry out direct actions (Vertigans and Sutton 2001). 
Al-Qa’ida, “does not have a permanent central command center.” Individual cells have, 
“a great deal of autonomy in choosing their targets and organizing their planning” (Orbach 
2001: 10). There is, “no ‘top-down’ organizational structure” (Martin 2003: 194). Such de-
scriptions contrast with the documentary evidence from the abandoned Afghan training camps 
that showed, “a bureaucratic organization with administrative lines of authority and an 
insistence on budgeting,” leading insiders to refer to al-Qa’ida as ‘the company’” (Kurzman 
2002: 17). Following the closure of the Afghan camps, Reuter (2004: 146) has argued that, 
“al-Qa’ida has reorganized . . . exchanging the relative stability and openness of a Taliban-
dominated Afghanistan for a vast, clandestine, decentralized underground operation with 
cadres based in cities and towns across Asia and Africa” and of course, Europe and North 
America. Such a transformation may be partly a consequence of the destruction of the Afghan 
camps with their militaristic structure. And as the International Institute for Strategic Study 
(2003) notes, “the counter-terrorism effort has perversely impelled an already highly de-
centralized and evasive transnational terrorist network to become more “virtual” and protean 
and, therefore, harder to identify and neutralize.” The re-emergence of al-Qa’ida in diverse or-
ganizational forms demonstrates the commitment of activists to pursue al-Qa’ida’s goals. In 
recent years a more decentralized and loosely organized activist network of has grown up 
with a polycephalous power structure in which local autonomy is becoming a key element. 
At the center of al-Qa’ida is what Burke (2003: 13) calls the “hardcore,” around 100 
highly motivated and trained activists who have remained physically and ideologically close 
to bin Laden since the end of the Afghan war. Burke suggests that the hardcore operated as 
trainers and administrators in Afghanistan, fought in Bosnia or Chechnya (and in the latter 
case continue to do so), act as recruitment agents, deal with other radical Islamic SMTOs and 
very occasionally, run terrorist operations themselves. This group is part of a “vanguard” aim-
ing to lead by example, providing direct and indirect support, guidance, financial assistance 
and training. The “hardcore” provide the link between the organized training camps and co-
vert, decentralized, operational cells.  
Beyond the hardcore, the composition of al-Qa’ida is less well defined. Through the 
Afghan training camps and relations with other radical groups, al-Qa’ida has recruited volun-
teers through the religious associations, mosques, community centers, and charities of the 
moderate Islamic movement to undertake activities on their behalf. Although al-Qa’ida is just 
one group within the radical movement, it has been able to tap into the wider movement 
through establishing “associate members” (Burke 2003: 207). Associates undertake activities 
and act as intermediaries or links to the, “vast, amorphous movement of modern radical Islam, 
with its myriad cells, domestic groups, ‘groupuscules’ and splinters, joining the ‘network of 
networks’ to the hardcore itself” (ibid). Since the onset of the “war on terrorism,” groups 
within the radical Islamic movement have become more autonomous as the al-Qa’ida hard-
core has become weaker through deaths, imprisonment, disappearances, and disrupted com-
munication channels. The loss of hardcore members has not prevented the continuation of the 
al-Qa’ida network though and there are signs that lower level members and recruits are now 
becoming more prominent (Johnstone and Sanger 2004). Despite increasing financial restric-
tions on al-Qa’ida, terrorist attacks organized by other SMTOs have also continued.  
The loose, decentralized arrangements within the movement have meant that attacks have 
often been initiated by people who consider themselves part of a single overarching move-
ment but have no known connection to existing radical groups. Some may have requested and 
received some funding and training from al-Qa’ida, but remain operationally autonomous. In 
this sense al-Qa’ida has employed a bottom-up approach with contacts, recruitment and at-
tacks initiated by individuals and groups wanting to join or carry out operations (Burke 2003; 
Sageman 2004). A case in point is the 1999 “millennium plot” to attack sites in Cali-fornia 
and Jordan. This relationship may seem in line with al-Qa’ida’s earlier strategy in which acti-
vists put ideas to the “hardcore” who then decide whether to give permission for a plot to 
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develop before allocating funding and support. However, the hierarchical relationship implied 
here seems no longer an adequate description. Of particular importance was the Bali bombing 
of 2002, which involved,  
 
sophisticated techniques and [was] motivated by a profound hatred of anything that 
represented the West. . . . [It] was an attack in the style of al-Qaeda [sic], but appar-
ently not involving the group itself. . . . As there was no one, in Afghanistan or else-
where, to go to for training and support, the Bali bombers did it on their own. (Burke 
2003: 237) 
 
Attacks on Western targets in Pakistan, Jordan, Kuwait, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Spain 
have also been undertaken since 2001 and there is no evidence to suggest that these operations 
involved al-Qa’ida. As bin Laden’s former bodyguard, Nasser Ahmad Nasser al-Bahri notes, 
“those who carry out operations are not necessarily Al-Qa’ida members. People without an 
organizational connection to Al-Qa’ida are perfectly capable of carrying out operations.”6  
Several commentators have recognized the internal transformation of al-Qa’ida and its 
lack of “normal” organizational form, but fail to provide adequate explanations of this trans-
formation, relying instead on extrapolating from descriptions of the current position. 
Gunaratna (2004: 93) argues that after September 11, 2001 “the drastic increase in the ter-
rorist threat has been a result of Al Qaeda’s transformation from a group into a movement,” 
while Al-Bahri (Middle East Media Research Institute, 2004) observes that, “today Al-Qa’ida 
is not an organization in the true sense of the word but only an idea that has become a faith.” 
Such descriptions of al-Qa’ida as a “movement,” a “faith,” or an “idea” are ways of grappling 
with al-Qa’ida’s loose and flexible networks from theoretical positions outside social move-
ment studies. In fact, this way of describing al-Qa’ida was also used much earlier in social 
movement studies to convey something of the novelty of many post-1960s NSMs (Dalton and 
Kuechler 1990). These accounts may help to identify al-Qa’ida’s impact but do not locate the 
group within the wider radical movement of which it is a part.  
The transnational radical Islamic movement is composed of networks and their rela-
tionships with other groups and loose associations. Although the movement is not the same as 
al-Qa’ida, it has been influenced and inspired by the SMTO’s violent direct actions, ideas, and 
religious values that have now transcended the group. Bringing radical Islam within a social 
movement framework holds out the potential to better understand the way that SMTOs like 
al-Qa’ida have developed over time, as a result of adapting to the opening up and closing 
down of political and organizational opportunities, as in Afghanistan, and how the context is 
instrumental in producing the type of structure which ranges from loose networks of activists 
to much tighter, hierarchical organizational arrangements. It also helps explain why their 
action repertoire has become increasingly violent, given the symbolic value of successful 
attacks against a more powerful enemy in emboldening potential supporters and participants.  
 
Uses of Symbolic Violence 
 
NSM theory alerted scholars to the significance of symbolism within social movements 
for movement activists, supporters and the uncommitted public. Using direct actions to create 
dramatic and often theatrical demonstrations, NSMs forcibly made their point by adopting 
non-violence as their touchstone protest style. This then allowed NSMs effectively to draw 
attention to the state security forces’ monopoly of the means of force and violence and to ally 
their own actions with peaceful action for change. In a similar vein, SMTOs such as al-Qa’ida 
have learned how powerful symbolic actions are. The key difference is that they use violent 
direct actions against carefully chosen targets to convey a symbolic message reflecting their 
interpretations of radical Islam. This marks them out as engaging in a unique form of direct 
action combining key elements of the NSMs with tactics that are highly meaningful to their 
own potential pool of support. 
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Many violent terrorist actions undertaken by al-Qa’ida and associated SMTOs have 
targeted highly symbolic sites, they are not simply opportunistic acts of violence. Abu Ayman 
al-Hilali, closely linked to bin Laden (cited in Paz 2002), argues with respect to the nature of 
Jihad that, “our solution is organized Jihad that sets at the head of its priorities the attack 
against American and Zionist interests. It should not just boycott their goods, but explode 
their headquarters, centers and industries, and everything that symbolizes them, such as 
MacDonalds, etc.” Targets have included exclusive hotels, business centers, religious insti-
tutions, military complexes, foreign embassies and residential compounds across North 
America, Europe, Asia and Africa. These attacks have enabled small, internationally active 
groups of terrorists to gain global media coverage that has increased levels of support and 
provided the inspiration for similar attacks. 
Such targeted attacks have a double symbolism, which bin Laden (1998b) recognized 
when lauding the suicide bombers who attacked sites in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in 1995 and Al-
Khober in 1997, “they have raised the nation’s [ummah] head high and washed away a great 
part of the shame that has enveloped us as a result of the weakness of the Saudi government 
and its complicity with the American government.” Hence, in addition to hitting the target 
itself, there is high symbolic capital in the nature of the attacks by the “underdog” against 
overwhelmingly more powerful forces, particularly when committed by suicide bombers who 
are seen as martyrs. First used in contemporary Islamic militancy by the Lebanese group 
Hezbolla, suicide attacks are theologically justified as ways of dying for the cause of Islam 
and the greater good and as a way to improve the individual’s salvation chances.7 
Awareness of the significance of symbols can also be seen in the simple, austere clothes 
and lifestyles of the al-Qa’ida hardcore that can then be compared to the “decadence” of the 
Saudi princes or the corruption within many Muslim governments. Bin Laden’s presence with 
the Afghan Arabs in harsh conditions despite his immense wealth has been an important im-
age contributing to his popularity (Bergen 2001; Reeve 1999). Such a portrayal has contri-
buted to the perception across radical groups of ‘bin Laden as a heroic figure, symbolic of 
their collective struggle” (Burke 2003: 14). This iconic status remains to this day, even though 
bin Laden’s practical involvement has significantly diminished.  
Radical Islamic groups adopt symbolic direct actions as a key part of their action reper-
toire, but unlike many other social movements, they are able to make the most effective sym-
bolic statements through violent actions against Western targets. The careful selection of 
targets shows that SMTOs like al-Qa’ida have quite a sophisticated understanding of the 
media-saturated social life of modern societies. Their use of violent actions is certainly very 
different in degree and extent to the non-violent NSMs, though the animal rights lobby, 
radical environmentalist fringe and pro-life groups have all used aggressive fear-inducing 
tactics to intimidate opponents.  
In some recent terrorist attacks, a more arbitrary and less symbolic approach to targeting 
has become evident. Indiscriminate attacks on Muslims in Saudi Arabia (2003 and 2004), 
Muslims killed in the Istanbul bombings (2003) as well as the ongoing violence against Mus-
lims in Iraq and the targeting of Spanish commuters in 2004, may be evidence of the reduced 
involvement of the al-Qa’ida hardcore in the planning process. These attacks have produced 
considerable revulsion across Muslim societies and communities and seem unlikely to gen-
erate support for the radical Islamic movement. 
 
The Goals of Islamic Radicalism  
 
 As al-Qa’ida has developed, particularly after bin Laden returned to Afghanistan in 
1996, it has become increasingly international and multi-faceted in the attempt to rouse and 
unite Muslims in militancy against the West and corrupt Muslim governments. Martin (2003: 
234) argues that al-Qa’ida, “has two overarching goals: to link together Muslim extremist 
groups throughout the world into a loose pan-Islamic revolutionary network and to expel non-
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Muslim (especially Western) influences from Islamic regions and countries.” Such goals 
could hardly be described as “self-limiting” in the same way that NSMs restricted their activ-
ity. Hence, once again, the al-Qa’ida network seems to draw selectively on the experience and 
successes of NSMs whilst at the same time pursuing its own global political agenda. Early al-
Qa’ida pronouncements concentrated on the Saudi regime and its departure from the Shari’ah, 
corruption, economic weakness, poor social services and the presence of U.S. forces on the 
land of the two holy places. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, militant 
Muslims concentrated upon liberating former Muslim territories in places like Kashmir, 
defending Muslims against attack (as in Bosnia), and attacking regimes considered irreligious 
and corrupt, predominantly in the Middle East. In the mid-1990s al-Qa’ida moved away from 
attacking the “near enemy” (local regimes) towards the “far enemy” (principally the U.S.). 
The change in strategy was a consequence of a growing belief within the militant movement 
that attacking local leaders was having limited impact. This is, they argued, because the West 
is instrumental in the problems within Muslim societies and is the main obstacle to the 
creation of an international ummah (Burke 2003; Sageman 2004; Saikal 2003). As a conse-
quence the international militants believe the West has to be confronted. In interviews from 
1996 and 1998 (declaring the formation of the World Islamic Front), bin Laden (1998a) 
signaled a move towards a more international or global perspective, taking in Israel, war 
against the Iraqi and Bosnian people, the deaths of innocent Muslims, and the use of nuclear 
weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The increasingly broad range of issues raised within the 
wider movement now includes the American refusal to sign the Kyoto agreement and the 
claim that natural surroundings are being destroyed and the environment polluted with Indus-
trial waste, “whilst leaving a world barely inhabitable for our children” (bin Laden 2002b).  
The breadth of coverage highlights the all-encompassing radical Islamic ideology that is 
critical of any aspect of social life not considered to be conforming to religious tenets. But as 
Halliday (2002: 50) observes, the issues of wealth distribution, poverty reduction or tackling 
the problems of the “world’s poor” are not addressed. Since September 11, 2001, al-Qa’ida 
has become more vociferous in its anti-Western rhetoric, seeking to broaden its appeal 
through identification with populist issues such as the Palestinian and Kashmiri struggles (bin 
Laden 2001a), extending the focus to Bosnia, Chechnya, East Timor, the Philippines, So-
malia, and Sudan (bin Laden 2001b). These are issues with considerable resonance across 
Muslim societies, particularly the USA’s perceived unconditional support for Israel (Davis 
2003) and negative aspects of “the civilization of the disbelievers” (stated in the letter left 
behind by the September 2001 terrorists).8 This is an effective strategy because, while there 
are many disagreements within the movement, there is a shared hatred of America which 
holds out the possibility of uniting a diverse range of views.  
Based on the statements of associated groups, it can be inferred that these goals should be 
set within the wider context of achieving the Shari’ah or divinely sanctioned law. The goals 
reflect the praxist character of radical Islam with its fusion of theory and practice (Vertigans 
2003) aiming, “to inspire a movement of purifying, cathartic community rebirth” (Calvert 
2004: 13). In this sense, similarities can be noted with movements associated with post-
material values, a focus upon civil society, and attempts to reconcile the interests of middle-
class and marginalized groups. However, al-Qa’ida and other groups also share similarities 
with Asbat ul Ansar in Lebanon, the Filipino Abu Sayyaf, the Islamic Movement in Uzbek-
istan, Indonesian Lashkar Jihad and al Ansar al Islami and al-Zarqawi’s al Tawhid al Jihad, 
now referred to as al-Qa’ida in Iraq, in seeking to reshape social relations. The broader 
movement therefore consists of multiple associations and networks of support. Participants 
may agree (although this is by no means inevitable) with al-Qa’ida and bin Laden’s state-
ments and groups may undertake actions that contribute towards international Jihad (“strug-
gle” at either the level of individual faith or interpreted by groups like al-Qa’ida to also mean 
“holy war”), but these groups also have their own concerns which may seem local or paro-
chial in comparison with the internationalism of al-Qa’ida, to whom they refuse to cede con-
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trol (Burke 2003). In this sense, radical Islam is not “self-limiting” in the same way that some 
Western NSMs have been. Some groups and networks do seek to take over states and to 
create a global Islamic revolutionary network to facilitate this.  
 
Radical Islamic Identities 
 
The NSM focus on processes of identity formation also provides an effective starting 
point from which to approach the study of radical Islamic identities. Militant internationalist 
Muslims do not share nationalist or nation-state centered ideologies (unlike groups fighting 
for national independence such as Hamas) and are opposed to many of the practices under-
taken and principles held by non-Islamic governments. As a consequence, it is unlikely that 
the movement will be assimilated into mainstream national political life. Instead, like NSM 
activists, they aim to live out lifestyle changes and implement their religious interpretations 
within existing societies. But how they seek to do this varies across organizations. Some, like 
the Tablighi Jamaat concentrate on proselytising and living according to their interpretation 
of the key Islamic precepts and standards. By comparison, groups associated with al-Qa’ida, 
while also practicing what they believe in (within the constraints of secular societies), see this 
as too slow or ineffective in uniting the international Muslim community. Hence, they turn to 
acts of symbolic violence to force through change.  
Like NSMs, militant groups emphasize their difference from others and espouse an 
expressive identity politics that provides clear behavioral guidelines. However, this emphasis 
is not a celebration of difference but an exclusionary approach based on their monopoly of 
truth and insistence on conformity. This does not make militants reactionary traditionalists 
though, as their construction of Islamic identities is very much a product of the contemporary 
era, developing in a variety of socioeconomic backgrounds through diverse socializing pro-
cesses which synthesize the historical and contemporary, the secular and religious, and their 
global and local influences and experiences (Burke 2003; Sageman 2004; Vertigans and 
Sutton 2001). They are not, as some psychologists argue, simply brainwashed in religious 
schools.9 As Sageman (2004) and Vertigans (2003) have pointed out, many militants have not 
attended such schools, instead initiating contact with the militant movement themselves. 
The norms, values, behavioral parameters and guidance transmitted by socializing agents 
including friends, teachers, and family are proving attractive to those encountering directly or 
witnessing through the mass media, experiences and events that radical Islamic ideologies 
explain. Radical identities are then developing, often over a period of years, based around re-
ligious norms, values and behavior that contribute towards self-realization, attempts to live 
authentic Islamic lifestyles, and increasing social isolation from outsiders. Sageman’s (2004) 
study of international jihadis discovered that the beliefs of many militants were gradually 
formed within friendship groups that became collectively radicalized over time. The dynamics 
within groups contributed to a growing intensity of belief and practices and led to group 
solidarity and collective identity transcending individual characteristics. At a political level, 
radical “Islamic” solutions to the longstanding corruption and weakness of Islamic states and 
the cultural, economic, and political threats seen to be posed by the West, especially the U.S. 
(Wiktorowicz and Kaltner 2003: 80), are internalized. Having accepted these praxist values, 
such identities orientate much more around radical interpretations of beliefs and activities 
with people becoming more willing to undertake violent actions. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The transnational radical Islamic movement and its constituent SMTOs and networks pose a 
challenge to social movement studies. Can they be analysed using theories and concepts from 
the social movements field? The argument here is that the assimilation of key NSM elements 
into the general social movements toolkit has opened up this possibility. If radical Islamic 
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movements emerged alongside Western NSMs and are amenable to analysis using concepts 
designed to study the latter, then instead of withering away, we may see rising support for re-
ligious movements and ideologies which are able to tap into post-Cold War fears and anxie-
ties associated with post-industrial and post-modern conditions. 
The al-Qa’ida network organizes in ways not dissimilar to secular NSMs, and is flexible 
enough to adapt to changing situations and national locations. Its connections to the wider 
radical Islamic movement are not fundamentally different to the networks that make up other 
social movements, though they are necessarily more clandestine than most. Its critique of the 
emerging U.S.-dominated international order bears similarity to that of anti-globalization mo-
bilizations, whilst its planning of symbolic direct actions and use of modern information 
technologies rivals that of well-established but non-violent secular SMOs. However, unlike 
many NSMs, the radical Islamic movement is not self-limiting but pursues the transformation 
of global social relations. Al-Qa’ida should be studied as a SMTO that is part of this wider 
movement, rather than as simply an aggregate of individual terrorists. This does not mean that 
the wider movement is tightly organized or consistently acts in concert. Rather, it is a loosely 
organized “network of networks” connected by a shared ideological position and the identi-
fication of a common opponent.  
The religious orientation of al-Qa’ida has served to keep it outside the mainstream of 
social movement studies, which strongly suggests that the development of the latter has 
primarily been through the analysis of secular movements. If so, then the postmaterialism of 
NSMs is a reminder that people can be spurred to action by intangible moral and religious 
values and perceived threats to these, in addition to material grievances. Bringing some of the 
central elements of NSM theory to bear on radical Islamic movements offers the potential to 
better explain their emergence and development as an alternative to currently popular, indi-
vidualistic explanations of violence in the name of religion as the consequence of brain-
washing by irrational madmen or the last resort of the materially deprived.10  
 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1 A recent exception is Cohen and Rai’s collection (2000), which includes two chapters on religious 
movements from the perspective of globalization theory. 
2 Although, Kurzman’s work on Islamic social movements dates back over a decade (see 1994, 1996). 
See also: Moaddel 2001; Moaddel and Talattof 2002; Parsa 2000; Voll 2001. 
3 Representatives from these groups signed, with bin Laden (1998a), a statement announcing the 
formation of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against Crusaders and Jews, an umbrella organization 
linking radicals across the world. 
4 Wahhabism and the Deobandis are rigorously conservative strands of Islam. The Muslim Brotherhood, 
originating in Egypt and Jamaat-i-Islami were more moderate with political representation in periods 
when participation was permitted. Radicalization of the Brotherhood under Qutb’s leadership (1906-
1966) has been influential in the development of al-Qa’ida’s ideology and structure.  
5Mohammed Atta and Ziad Jarrah, the two most influential pilots in the attacks on America in 2001, are 
good examples. Both were well educated and from middle class backgrounds.  
6 Al-Bahri is quoted in Middle East Media Research Institute 2004. 
7 Disagreements exist about the legitimacy of suicide attacks in Islamic doctrine. Even radical groups 
disagree about the legitimacy of attacks by other groups. Hamas was extremely critical of the September 
2001 acts for instance (see Davis 2003; Reuter 2004; Wiktorowicz and Kaltner 2003).  
8 The letter can be found at http:www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel01/letter.htm. 
9 See for example Sofsky 2002. 
10See Dawkins’s (2001) inadequate response to al-Qa’ida’s attacks on American targets in 2001. 
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